Non-Organic Theories of Value and Pointless Evil by O\u27Leary-Hawthorne, John
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 9 Issue 3 Article 7 
7-1-1992 
Non-Organic Theories of Value and Pointless Evil 
John O'Leary-Hawthorne 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
O'Leary-Hawthorne, John (1992) "Non-Organic Theories of Value and Pointless Evil," Faith and Philosophy: 
Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 9 : Iss. 3 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol9/iss3/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
NON-ORGANIC THEORIES OF VALUE 
AND POINTLESS EVIL 
John O'Leary-Hawthorne 
In this paper, I shall argue that if a certain theory of value is correct, then 
there is pointless evil in the world. I shall not try to defend the theory. Nor 
shall I assume that a justified belief in pointless evil is sufficient epistemic 
warrant for atheism. Thus I am not arguing for atheism here. This paper is 
intended rather to help elucidate what it would take to demonstrate that no 
one is justified in believing in pointless evil. If my thesis is correct, then any 
successful attempt to show that no belief in pointless evil is justified will, 
inter alia, have to demonstrate that belief in what I shall call "a non-organic 
theory of value" is irrational. 
1. Preliminary Considerations 
According to a non-organic theory of value, the quantity of non-derivative 
value that obtains at one temporal stage of the universe depends solely upon 
the intrinsic facts that obtain at that temporal stage. I (Something is of non-
derivative value just in case it is valuable in itself. By contrast, something 
has instrumental value just in case it brings about something of non-derivative 
value.) Hence on this view the non-derivative value attaching to some stage 
is not, even in part, determined by its place in the temporal order of things. 
Such a theory will be subscribed to by anyone who thinks that the fundamen-
tal bearers of value are momentary mental states. Thus it is held, notably, by 
the utilitarian who holds that the value that obtains during some period of the 
universe's history depends solely upon the balance of pleasure over pain that 
obtains at that period.2 The proponent of such a theory need not, of course, 
claim that we speak falsely when we ascribe value to items whose temporal 
structure seems important-a piece of music, for example. Rather she would 
insist that the value of such things is merely instrumental. We may formulate 
the non-organic thesis as follows: 
1. The balance of non-derivative value over disvalue of any temporal stage 
in the universe's history supervenes on the intrinsic details of that tempo-
ral stage. 
That is, if some stage of the actual world is intrinsically the same as some 
stage of another possible world, then according to the non-organic theory, 
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those two stages must have equivalent amounts of non-derivative value at-
taching to them. 
The existence of pointless evil can be inferred from the non-organic theory, 
coupled with the following principle: there is no metaphysically necessary 
connection between the intrinsic structure of events at one temporal stage of 
the world and the intrinsic structure of events at another, non-overlapping 
temporal stage. This principle does not merely deny that the intrinsic detail 
at one temporal stage is a sufficient condition for every intrinsic detail at 
every other non-overlapping stage. Rather, it claims that the intrinsic detail 
at any given temporal stage is not a sufficient condition for any intrinsic detail 
at any other non-overlapping stage. 
Why might one hold this stronger thesis? Here is one good reason. Take 
the intrinsic state of a possible world Wl at some time t. It seems that there 
is another world W2 which, at the first moment of its existence, is exactly 
like WI at t. It also seems that there is a third world W3 which, at the last 
moment of its existence, is exactly like Wl at t. I cannot prove that these 
worlds are possible. But I offer it as a reasonable metaphysical conjecture 
that they are possible. Those worlds would doubtless have different laws of 
nature. But that requirement only makes problems for my conjecture if the 
laws of nature that operate at this world are reasonably thought to be meta-
physically necessary. But I know of no good reason to think that they are. 
One virtue of my metaphysical conjecture is that something like it looms 
large in Christian thinking, and so the atheist who employs it cannot be 
accused of question-begging. For it is commonly thought that God has the 
power to create ex nihilo a world which at the moment of creation was just 
like the state of the actual world at some particular moment in time. More-
over, the doctrine that God can perform miracles requires the God not be 
constrained by causal laws, which in turn requires that those laws be contingent. 
If possible worlds of the sort that I have entertained really are possible, 
then it would indeed seem to follow that the intrinsic detail at one temporal 
stage is not a sl}fficient condition for any intrinsic fact at any other non-over-
lapping stage. Take some such intrinsic fact F. If F obtains at a temporal stage 
T2 which is later than another stage Tl, then the intrinsic detail at Tl is not 
sufficient for Fat T2 since it is possible that T1 be the last stage in the world's 
history, in which case F would not have obtained. If F obtains at Tl, the detail 
at 1'2 is not sufficient for F since it is possible for T2 to be the first stage in 
the world's history. So, neither the intrinsic detail of earlier nor later stages 
is sufficient for F. Since the considerations presented here do not depend on 
any peculiarities had by F, they generalize to any intrinsic fact at any stage. 
There is one objection that is worth discussing, brought to my attention by 
William Alston. The principle, as I have stated it, ranges not just over the 
world created by God, but over God Himself. (So long as God is in time, that 
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is.) Now the theist may well be willing to concede that the temporal stages 
of the cosmos are metaphysically independent. But she will be unlikely to 
concede that the temporal stages of God are so independent. For one thing, that 
would have the consequence that God can commit suicide, a controversial doc-
trine indeed. To take care of this, we can formulate the principle as follows: 
2. The intrinsic structure of non-overlapping temporal stages of the cosmos 
is not linked by metaphysical necessity, where 'cosmos' is intended to 
include the whole domain of contingent beings. 
The 'intrinsic' qualification is of course crucial here. Take the stage at which 
I was born. Take the stage at which my mother was born. If Kripke's necessity 
of origins thesis is correct, then the birth of John Hawthorne is linked by 
metaphysical necessity to the birth of Mary Hawthorne. That doesn't violate 
the principle above, however. All it entails is that there are possible worlds 
which have spatio-temporal zones which are intrinsically exactly like the one 
occupied by my birth at this world, but where I am not born. In what follows 
I shall indicate how one can reasonably infer the existence of pointless evil 
on the basis of (1) and (2) above. 
2. The Argument 
An event E is an instance of pointless evil just in case (a) it has non-deriv-
ative disvalue, (b) there is no event or class of events which E is necessary 
for and whose non-derivative value equals or outweighs E and (c) there is no 
event or class of events whose non-derivative disvalue is greater than E and 
which E is necessary to prevent.3 
Why the restriction to non-derivative value/disvalue? Well, suppose an evil 
was metaphysically necessary for some event of great instrumental value. 
One couldn't infer that the evil wasn't pointless unless that instrumental value 
was in turn necessary for some event of non-derivative value (whose value 
was greater than the disvalue of the evil.) The following example should 
illustrate this. Suppose I kill Joe and thereby save ten lives. The death of Joe 
might reasonably be taken to be of great instrumental value. Suppose further 
that I could have saved those ten lives without harming anybody. In that case, 
we would be in no position to infer that the death of Joe wasn't pointless on 
the basis of its instrumental value. 
We can now proceed with the argument. Take some occurrence which your 
favorite non-organic theory holds to be of non-derivative disvalue. Let us 
suppose it is a pain which occurs at t in the actual world. Take the temporal 
stage of the actual world which includes all future times after t. If (2) is 
correct, there is no metaphysically necessary connection between the intrinsic 
structure of the latter stage and the pain. So there is a possible world where 
the pain doesn't occur, but where the intrinsic facts that obtain after t at the 
actual world still obtain. So by (1), if some non-organic theory is true, there 
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is a possible world where the same quantity of goodness obtains after t but 
where the pain doesn't occur. Similar considerations show that if some non-
organic theory is true, there is a possible world where the same quantity of 
goodness obtains before t but where the pain doesn't occur. Consider next 
any past or future evils which would have obtained if the pain hadn't ob-
tained. The presence of pain can't be absolutely necessary for the prevention 
of such evils, for that would violate (2). 
Therefore, if (1) and (2) are correct, it seems that the only ways to defend 
the claim that the pain is not an instance of pointless evil is to assert either 
(a) that there are goods that obtain at the time of the pain that the pain was 
necessary for of else (b) that there are evils that would have obtained at the 
time of the pain that the pain was necessary to prevent. 
We can quickly dismiss (b). There is a world whose whole history is the 
same as the history of the actual world after t. So there is no evil which does 
not obtain at our world which the pain at t is necessary to prevent. How about 
(a)? This move has very little prima facie plausibility. Even those who hold 
that the pains of, say, Holocaust victims had a point would hardly be inclined 
to suggest that their point is to be found at the time that the suffering was 
endured.4 
Perhaps the theist will grant that there are no goods that obtain in the world 
of spatia-temporal beings that the pain is necessary for. However, he might 
argue that there are goods that obtain in the life of God for which the pain is 
necessary. Again, though, this line looks very implausible. Most theists would 
not take seriously the possibility that the pains of Holocaust victims are 
justified by, say, the pleasure they give directly to God. They would concede 
that such pains, if they are justified at all, are justified at least in part by 
virtue of benefits that accrue to the victims themselves or to other creatures 
of God. 
Thus there is good reason to think that given a non-organic theory of value, 
there is pointless evil in the world. We can use this result to show that a 
common objection against justified belief in pointless evil is wanting. It runs 
like this. To judge whether an evil is pointless, one needs epistemic access 
to its consequences. Human beings lack the power to compute the state of 
the world at times far into the future. Hence we are not in a position to believe 
reasonably that there is pointless evil. I have shown that it is by no means 
clear that in order to believe justifiably that there is pointless evil, one needs 
to have epistemic access to distant spatio-temporal zones. All one needs is a 
justified belief in the metaphysical independence of non-overlapping tempo-
ral stages of the world together with a justified belief that some non-organic 
theory of value is true. (Well, to be accurate, one also needs the justified 
belief that there is at least one instance of evil.) None of this requires clair-
voyant powers. 
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To conclude, then, an adequate attack on the epistemic status of belief in 
pointless evil will have to give good reason to doubt the rationality of belief 
in (1) or (2) above. Since those attacks that I know of have not undertaken 
this task, they are inadequate. 5.6 
Syracuse University 
NOTES 
1. I shall be assuming a 4-d view of concrete objects. It should be clear, however, that 
my remarks do not depend on this. 
2. I am assuming of course that the quantity of pleasure and pain that obtains at a time 
is determined by the intrinsic state of the universe at that time. This seems to be obviously 
true. 
3. A few refinements may be appropriate here. However, to incorporate them and then 
to address them in what follows would make the text unnecessarily cluttered. I leave it as 
an exercise for the reader to add his favorite refinements and discover how it leaves the 
central thrust of the argument untouched. 
4. A theist can reasonably argue that there is some point to evil that is found at the time 
suffering is endured. Marilyn Adams suggests that when we suffer we obtain some 
"identification with and vision into the inner life of the creator." ("Redemptive Suffering: 
A Christian Solution to the Problem of Evil," in Rntionality, Religious Belief and Moral 
Commitment, eds. Audi and Wainwright, [Cornell University Press, 1986], p. 267). But it 
is hard to take seriously the claim that a sufficient reason for the permission of all actual 
evils can be found along these lines. 
5. See for example, Stephen Wykstra, "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments 
from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of 'Appearance'." International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion (1984); Bruce Reichenbach, Evil and a Good God. (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1982). 
6. I would like to thank William Alston, Daniel Howard-Snyder, and Frances Howard-
Snyder for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
